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CRIMINAL ADVISORY JURIES: A SENSIBLE 
COMPROMISE FOR JURY SENTENCING 
ADVOCATES 
Kurt A. Holtzman 
ABSTRACT 
Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch recently noted that “juries in our constitutional 
order exercise supervisory authority over the judicial function by limiting the judge’s 
power to punish.” Yet in the majority of jurisdictions, contemporary judge-only sentencing 
practices neuter juries of their supervisory authority by divorcing punishment from guilt 
decisions. Moreover, without a chance to voice public disapproval at sentencing, juries 
are muted in their ability to express tailored, moral condemnation for distinct criminal 
acts. Although the modern aversion to jury sentencing is neither historically nor 
empirically justified, jury sentencing opponents are rightly cautious of abdicating 
sentencing power to laypeople. Nevertheless, jury endorsement of criminal sentencing is 
critical to the legitimacy of criminal law. It is also necessary if criminal law is to remain 
responsive to evolving social mores. Unfortunately, today, studies suggest that actual 
criminal sentences are largely detached, if not divergent, from community preference. The 
criminal advisory jury is a mechanism to solve these issues by allowing juries to express 
community sentiment on punishment while preserving the values inherent in autonomous 
judicial sentencing. The jury is one of the most democratic institutions within the United 
States and sits readily assembled for most criminal trials. Failing to solicit its views of just 
desert for the criminal it has convicted is an opportunity wasted; an opportunity the 
criminal advisory jury construct will seize. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Since the nation’s founding, juries have been viewed as a hallmark of the Anglo-
American legal system.1 The ultimate adjudication of both criminal conviction and civil 
 
 J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. Special thanks to Professor Shari Seidman Diamond, 
without whose seminar on juries and early encouragement this Note would have never been possible. 
Thank you to Judge Morris B. Hoffman and Judge James S. Gwin. Their writings on juries and sentencing 
provided the genesis for this idea. I borrowed from them admiringly. Thank you as well to the 
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy, especially Alana Paris, Emily Gleichert, and Kate 
Vandenberg. I am humbled by their grace and editorial skill. 
1 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968) (“Among the resolutions adopted by the First 
Congress of the American Colonies (the Stamp Act Congress) on October 19, 1765 . . . was the declaration: 
‘That trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.’”); 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 442 (Adrienne Koch & William 
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liability by lay community representatives, rather than government officials or legal elites, 
legitimizes the law and provides democratic endorsement for the normative goals the law 
seeks to achieve.2 Unlike both the judge and the legislator, a jury’s expression of moral 
condemnation is immune from impeachment by institutional and political influences.3 And 
in the criminal context, the jury stands as the final intercessor between the coercive power 
of the state and the individual liberties the state seeks to deny.4 These principles, germane 
to the ratification of the jury right within the Constitution,5 remain paramount today.6 
 Despite the importance of juries and the Sixth Amendment’s protection of the 
criminal jury right,7 the criminal jury’s sentencing power remains hollow.8 In the majority 
of jurisdictions, the jury’s role in a noncapital criminal trial is relegated to the determination 
of guilt while punishment is administered by judge alone.9 Juries, for their part, are asked 
to mechanically apply broadly applicable laws to nuanced situations and form binary 
decisions on guilt while remaining deliberately ignorant of those decisions’ consequences. 
Criminal culpability, on the contrary, is not binary;10 it lies along a continuum of right and 
wrong defined by social mores and cultural norms. Decoupling punishment from guilt 
forces a false dichotomy onto juries which is not only unrealistic in the abstract but a 
practical hazard to the fact-finding function of trials. Without a say in punishment, juries’ 
ability to tailor their moral condemnation to criminal acts is stifled. And, in situations 
where the law does not align neatly with the idea of justice that particular circumstances 
 
Peden eds., 1993) (The jury is “the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be 
held to the principles of its constitution.”). 
2 Gianni Ribeiro & Emma Antrobus, Investigating the Impact of Jury Sentencing Recommendations Using 
Procedural Justice Theory, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 535, 536 (2017). 
3 “[T]he truth of every accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve 
of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.” 4 W. BLACKSTONE, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England 349-50 (Cooley ed. 1899) (emphasis added). See Jenia Iontcheva, 
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 350-53 (2003). 
4 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. 
5 The Declaration of Independence stated solemn objections to the King's making “Judges dependent on his 
Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries,” and to his 
“depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.” The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 
1776). 
6 “[J]uries in our constitutional order exercise supervisory authority over the judicial function by limiting 
the judge’s power to punish. . . . [T]he Constitution’s guarantees cannot mean less today than they did the 
day they were adopted. . . .” United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2376 (2019).    
7 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
8 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury 
sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact.”). 
9 In noncapital felony cases, only six states permit juries to make sentencing decisions. ARK. CODE ANN. § 
5-4-103 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (West 
2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926.1 (West 2016); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.07 (West 2019); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (West 2007). Likewise, sentencing is conducted by the judge in all federal 
courts. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32. 
10 “[C]riminal law . . . is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with the degree 
of criminal culpability.” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975). 




demand, the only check a jury has against the coercive power of the state is to bend the 
truth through nullification.11 
 Advocates for expanding the jury’s role in sentencing point to the reemergence of 
retributivism as the leading theory of punishment and the comparative superiority of juries 
in defining just deserts.12 Opponents, however, suggest a jury’s cure is worse than the 
disease, characterizing juries as incompetent, emotionally irrational, and erratic.13 They 
argue that if sentencing is left to untrained laypeople, not only will it threaten truth-finding 
by enabling jury compromise,14 but it will produce fickle and unfair outcomes,15 
deteriorating the confidence society places in the rule of law itself. In other words, although 
the tyranny of the state should be feared, so too should the tyranny of the crowd.16 Not only 
is the jury’s current limited role traditionally and constitutionally supported,17 but the 
judge, it is argued, represents the best alternative for applying the law in an objective, 
unprejudiced, and consistent manner.18 Furthermore, jury competence aside, expanding the 
jury’s role as sentencer will impose additional procedural costs onto a court system already 
overburdened and under-resourced.19 
 Reasonable minds can and do disagree on whether a jury is suited to assume 
responsibility for noncapital criminal sentencing. This Note does not seek to settle that 
debate. Instead, it proposes a modest procedural inclusion of the jury at the criminal 
 
11 Juror nullification refers to the power of jurors to return verdicts that are counter to both the law and the 
evidence. Irwin A. Horowitz, Norbert Kerr, Ernest Park & Christine Gockel, Chaos in the Courtroom 
Reconsidered: Emotional Bias and Juror Nullification, 30 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 164 (2006). 
Although documented incidents of juror nullification are rare, when juries do nullify, it is typically due to a 
perception that the law or its consequences are unfair. Mary Claire Mulligan, Jury Nullification: Its History 
and Practice, COLO. LAW., Dec. 2004, at 71, 75. For this reason, some observers contend that juror 
sentencing authority actually negates juror nullification. See Comment, Consideration of Punishment by 
Juries, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 400, 409 (1950) (suggesting nullification can be eliminated by permitting juries 
to recommend mercy thereby “eas[ing] their consciences . . . by convincing themselves that the penalty will 
be light.”). 
12 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring); see Morris B. Hoffman, The Case 
for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 991-92 (2003); Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 350. 
13 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157. 
14 Compromise verdicts are verdicts resulting from situations in which jurors agree to a lighter sentence in 
order to break deadlocks on guilt. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 989.  
15 Charles W. Webster, Jury Sentencing—Grab-Bag Justice, 14 SW. L.J. 221, 230 (1960); Robert A. 
Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 39 (1994); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 YALE L.J. 
1355, 1374-75 (1999). 
16 James Madison, while discussing how a representative democracy can ensure the triumph of critical 
reason over irrational desire, maintained that “it is the reason of the public alone that ought to controul and 
regulate the government. [But] [t]he passions [of the public] ought to be controuled and regulated by the 
government . . . Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have 
been a mob.” 10 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 505 (Robert A. Rutland et al eds., 
Univ. of Chicago Press 1977). 
17 See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 967, for a discussion on how the dominance of judicial sentencing in state 
and federal courts resulted from an historical accident. See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 972, for a discussion 
on jury sentencing as it relates to the evolution of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  
18 See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 7-8 (1998); William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 
339 (1991). 
19 Randall R. Jackson, Missouri's Jury Sentencing Law: A Relic the Legislature Should Lay to Rest, 55 J. 
MO. B. 14, 14-15 (1999). 
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sentencing stage which relies on neither a radical shift in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
nor a voluntary abdication of judicial sentencing discretion. This Note proposes the 
adoption of a criminal advisory jury; specifically, one used for noncapital criminal 
sentencing. To some extent, the idea parallels the current availability of advisory juries in 
civil cases; however, the proposal does not mirror the civil advisory jury in full. Although 
this Note’s proposal involves multiple facets, its underlying premise is that the use of 
advisory juries for noncapital criminal sentencing represents a sensible compromise 
between jury sentencing advocates and jury sentencing opponents by allowing for a 
community voice at the punishment phase of trial without inviting the significant 
inefficiencies, potential inconsistencies, or possible mistakes that some fear juries may 
produce.20 
 This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background for understanding 
how jury sentencing has evolved over time into its current, limited role and how modern 
policy arguments weigh against its expansion. Part II examines ways in which both formal 
and informal advisory juries are currently being used in litigation. This includes the 
formalized civil advisory jury, non-binding jury sentencing schemes currently in force in a 
minority of jurisdictions, and informal jury opinions sought or permitted by judges during 
sentencing. Lessons derived from these examples help shape the criminal advisory jury 
proposal. Part III outlines that proposal. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Before discussing the criminal advisory jury proposal, some context is warranted. 
Neither the history detailed next nor the overview of the jury sentencing debate which 
follows is meant to be exhaustive. Instead, it simply provides the framework necessary to 
claim, as the subtitle does, why this proposal represents a compromise. 
A.  History of Jury Sentencing 
In the American legal system today, noncapital criminal jury sentencing is viewed as 
an anachronism. Only six states preserve some form of the practice.21 Although the 
conventional wisdom has trended away from jury sentencing, understanding the historical 
underpinnings of that trend is necessary for countenancing change. Like most good legal 
origin stories in this country, the history of jury sentencing begins in England. 
Although the ancient Greeks and Romans used juries to decide both guilt and 
punishment, England had no jury tradition until William the Conqueror established the 
institution toward the end of the eleventh century.22 Even after the Norman Conquest, 
however, jury trials remained exceedingly rare until the medieval alternatives of trial by 
combat, compurgation, and ordeal began to fall into disrepute around the mid-1200s.23 
 
20 See supra note 15. 
21 See supra note 9. 
22 LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 2-3, 13-19 (2d ed. 1988). 
23 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE 
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 37-40 (2d ed. 1898). Trial by combat disappeared by the end of the reign of 
Edward III in the late-1300s. EDWARD J. WHITE, LEGAL ANTIQUITIES 118 (1913). Trial by compurgation, 
which involved the accused taking an oath of innocence and then calling a sufficient number of “oath 
helpers”—often twelve—to vouch under oath to the accused’s trustworthiness, ROBERT VON 
MOSCHZISKER, TRIAL BY JURY §§ 43-45 (2d ed. 1930), was officially banned in 1166 by Henry II. MOORE, 




While the rise of juries tempered the cruelty of criminal trials, criminal punishment 
remained particularly harsh for centuries longer.24 For instance, almost all serious crimes 
through the 1600s in England carried the death penalty.25 For less serious crimes, the 
punishment was banishment;26 and for petty crimes, the punishment was either corporal 
punishment or fines.27 More importantly, these punishments were mandatory.28  
This combination—harsh punishments strictly attached to particular offenses—
created two practical consequences: first, although in many instances the judge formally 
imposed punishment, the judge’s lack of discretion meant the punishment was set de facto 
by the jury’s verdict.29 Second, if juries believed the harsh punishments—especially 
death—were not justified, they often refused to convict.30 These “pious perjuries,” as 
Blackstone dubbed them (because the jury’s refusal to convict reflected a pious yet 
perjurious violation of their oath), fostered a mistrust of juries among the Crown’s judges.31 
Consequently, over the centuries, these king-made judges helped develop an English 
common law that deprived juries of any formal sentencing authority.32 This English 
common law followed American colonists to the new world. It was also this English 
common law that many American states rejected.33 
Enthusiasm for self-government and memories of arbitrary Crown-appointed judges 
motivated many early American states to adopt jury sentencing.34 An expansion of 
noncapital sentencing options—particularly made possible by the invention of the 
penitentiary in 1790 by Pennsylvanian Quakers35—also reduced institutional fear of “pious 
perjuries” and increased trust in oath-honoring juries.36 Indeed, it was a mistrust of elitist, 
unelected judges that helped expand the use of jury sentencing even as memories of English 
oppression faded.37 Although historical records of colonial sentencing practices are almost 
 
supra note 22, at 37-38. Trial by ordeal typically required the accused to survive carrying hot irons or 
walking over hot coals or to survive being thrown into a pond with their hands bound. VON MOSCHZISKER, 
supra, § 49. The ordeal was banned by Pope Innocent III in 1215. JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL 
BY JURY, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT § 28 (F.B. Rothman 1986) (1877). 
24 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *98. 
25 Id. 
26 John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Jury: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 36-37 (1983). 
27 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 584 (3d ed. 1990). 
28 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *396. 
29 THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800, at 98 (1985). 
30 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *238-39. 
31 Id. 
32 See generally Hoffman, supra note 12, at 963; Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 310. 
33 See Edward A. Linden, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REV. 968, 970-71 (1967); Craig Reese, 
Jury Sentencing in Texas: Time for a Change, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 323, 326-27 (1990). 
34 See Charles O. Betts, Jury Sentencing, 2 NAT'L PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N J. 369, 370 (1956). 
35 NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 4-5 (1974). 
36 Hoffman, supra note 12, at 963-64. For example, in 1796, Virginia formally adopted jury sentencing for 
all criminal offenses in the same reform legislation which adopted imprisonment as the punishment for a 
variety of felonies. Act of Dec. 22, 1796, §§5-15, 1796 Va. Acts ch. 2. 
37 EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 96-97 (1944). Hostility towards judges who 
were unresponsive to the popular will grew throughout the nineteenth century, and many states adopted 
jury sentencing in concert with the movement in the mid-to-late-1800s towards an elective judiciary. Id. at 
80-135. 
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nonexistent,38 it is clear that from 1800 to 1900 roughly half of all states used juries to 
impose noncapital criminal sentences.39 Even in those states that did not employ jury 
sentencing, strict determinative sentencing schemes allowed juries to indirectly dictate 
sentencing through their verdict just like their English predecessors.40 
American ideals throughout this era regarded juries as the epitome of decentralized 
democracy.41 The jury, as a deliberative democratic institution, represented an essential 
feature of self-government and a necessary check against unjust legislation and arbitrary 
judicial power.42 In fact, during this era, the jury right was viewed not as a right of the 
defendant but rather as a right of the community.43 In this vein, juries not only determined 
matters of fact, but in partnership with judges, determined matters of law.44 It was not until 
1895 that the Supreme Court declared questions of law to be outside the jury’s province.45 
This change, however, signaled a shift in values. Thereafter, the twentieth century would 
see an erosion of jury authority—and consequently, a decline of jury sentencing.46 
By 1910, progressive beliefs in the possibility of rehabilitation began to prioritize 
utilitarianism and legal expertise over retributivism and community wisdom.47 Legal 
institutions viewed criminal law not as a system to punish criminals for their immoral acts 
but rather as a system to cure them of their antisocial behavior. The idea that lay jurors 
could administer these quasi-medical procedures appeared nonsensical.48 Instead, 
Congress and state legislatures created a class of professional parole officers, 
commissioners, and criminal justice experts to help in determining defendants’ actual 
punishment.49 The rise of law schools and the professionalization of the bar further 
 
38 Hoffman, supra note 12, at 963, n.43. 
39 Wright, supra note 15, at 1373. 
40 Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 319. 
41 Letter from The Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1782), reprinted in 2 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 245, 249-50 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“It is essential in every free country, that common people should have a part 
and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative department . . . The trial by jury in the 
judicial department and the collection of the people by their representatives in the legislature are those 
fortunate inventions which have procured for them, in this country, their true proportion of influence . . .”). 
42 Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, WIS. L. REV. 377, 395-96 
(1999). 
43 In 1930 the Supreme Court authorized defendants for the first time to waive jury trials and choose bench 
trials, thereby implying that before then defendants were not the principal beneficiary of the jury system. 
See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297-98 (1930). 
44 Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 173 (1964). A legal 
theory of natural law, which held that higher values intrinsic to human nature could be deduced and applied 
independent of black-letter law, supported the predominant political philosophy of the eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries. Id. at 172. Because natural law was thought to be accessible by ordinary people, 
judges of this era frequently advised juries that they were not bound by the court’s instructions and could 
judge the law themselves. Id. at 174. It was generally thought, however, that jurors would only disregard 
court instructions in unusual cases. Id. at 172, n.15. 
45 Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895). 
46 See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1510-11 (2001) (“The 
number of jurisdictions that allowed any jury sentencing in non-capital cases dwindled by the mid-
twentieth century to thirteen states.”). 
47 See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 16-17 (1998). 
48 See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 965-66, n.55. 
49 Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 326. 




increased perception of disparate capabilities between lawyer and layman.50 In turn, 
judges—equipped with criminologist-crafted pre-sentence reports and their own legal 
expertise—assumed juries’ sentencing duties.51 By the 1970s, however, the rehabilitative 
model was under attack. 
 The rehabilitative model’s attempts at individualized treatment of offenders 
produced gross disparities between punishments issued to different defendants of similar 
crimes.52 These disparities, it was perceived, were based in large part on judges’ ideological 
or emotional dispositions.53 Additionally, the growth in violent crime in the late 1960s and 
1970s prompted observers to question the feasibility of “curing” defendants.54 Thus, 
retributivism returned to fashion.55 However, the chosen solution for unequal treatment 
among defendants and the irrationality of some judicial decision making was not to return 
to the collective wisdom of twelve impartial jurors; it was something else: math.56 
 By the 1980s, sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing laws became 
popular among the states, and Congress followed suit with the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.57 These sentencing guidelines offered a form of predictable determinative sentencing 
which could be applied even-handedly to all defendants.58 Just deserts were thus derived 
not from moral judgments, but from legislatively enacted formulas that applied an array of 
objective criteria to calculate punishment.59 And, of course, the pendulum swung. The 
criminal justice community soon observed that not only were the guidelines unmoored 
from community sentiment,60 but they were brutally inflexible.61 Truly individualized 
punishment for defendants was a mirage, as the guidelines sharply constrained judicial 
discretion.62 Under the guidelines, judges retained marginal leeway on how to apply 
sentencing factors within formulaic constraints, but juries’ voices were excluded entirely.63 
Enter Charles Apprendi. 
 In 2000, the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey was a major 
turning point for jury sentencing power.64 The case centered on the sentencing of Charles 
 
50 CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 3-28 (1980). 
51 See Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 326-27. 
52 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 133 (1969). 
53 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 23 (1973) (“The particular 
defendant on some existential day confronts a specific judge. The occupant of the bench on that day may be 
punitive, patriotic, self-righteous, guilt-ridden, and more than customarily dyspeptic.”). 
54 Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 327. 
55 See id. at 327-28. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 328-29. 
58 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.). 
59 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1988). 
60 Douglas R. Thomson & Anthony J. Ragona, Popular Moderation Versus Governmental 
Authoritarianism: An Interactionist View of Public Sentiments Toward Criminal Sanctions, 33 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 337, 354 (1987). 
61 Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate 
Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 63 (1993). Along with the establishing sentencing guidelines, most 
sentencing reform efforts (including at the federal level) abolished parole. Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 329. 
62 Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 329-30. 
63 Id. 
64 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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Apprendi following his New Jersey conviction for unlawful firearm possession.65 In New 
Jersey, this “second-degree” offense carried a punishment of five to ten years 
imprisonment.66 However, at sentencing and in accordance with a separate New Jersey 
“hate crime” statute, the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Apprendi’s “crime was motivated by racial bias.”67 This finding mandated an extended 
term of ten to twenty years imprisonment, and the trial judge sentenced Apprendi to 
twelve.68  
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Stevens explained that due process and the impartial jury 
trial right, taken together, require that any fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.69 Until this point, legislatures 
were free to delineate between “elements” of an offense and “sentencing factors,” even 
though the difference was purely semantic.70 Within this dichotomy, only elements needed 
to be charged in the indictment and found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt while 
sentencing factors could be found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence.71 Not 
any longer. Because Apprendi’s judge—not his jury—found his second-degree offense to 
be racially motivated (a sentencing factor that increased Apprendi’s penalty beyond the 
statutory maximum), the extended term mandatorily applied to his conviction was 
unconstitutional.72 
 Although Apprendi’s holding was limited to sentencing guideline factors that 
increased the sentence beyond the statutory maximum, Apprendi’s progeny quickly 
expanded its reach.73 Immediately after Apprendi, judges were still free to be the factfinders 
for guideline-mandated sentencing factors that increased the sentence so long as the 
increase stayed within the offense’s statutory limits.74 By 2004, however, the Court made 
clear that the Sixth Amendment reserves to the jury the “function of finding the facts 
essential to lawful imposition of the penalty.”75 Thus, “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the 
penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”76 This meant that any increase invoked Apprendi protections, not just 
 
65 Id. at 469-70. 
66 Id. at 469. 
67 Id. at 471. 
68 Id. at 469, 471. 
69 Id. at 468, 476-77, 490. 
70 “[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the 
elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged. . . . [T]he applicability 
of the reasonable-doubt standard . . . has always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is 
charged in any given case.” McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-
11, n. 12 (1977) (internal quotations removed). 
71 Id. at 86. 
72 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-92. 
73 In Ring v. Arizona, the Court applied Apprendi to overrule Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990)—a 
case upholding a capital sentencing system that permitted judges rather than juries to find the specific 
aggravating factors justifying the imposition of death in capital sentencing proceedings. 536 U.S. at 588-89. 
Additionally, although the Court in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), initially distinguished 
between facts that increase a statutory maximum and facts that increase only a mandatory minimum, this 
“inconsistency” was overruled in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). 
74 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481. 
75 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308-09 (2004). 
76 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155 (emphasis added). 




those which exceeded statutory maxima. Judges were still able to exercise their discretion 
(including considering evidence that was not admissible at trial) to impose sentences within 
the range prescribed by statute; however, sentencing guidelines could no longer legally 
compel a particular sentence based on any fact not found by the jury.77 This revelation 
logically implied one of two results: either every aggravating fact inherent within 
sentencing guidelines’ computational schemes would need to be tried before a jury (thereby 
giving juries de facto control over sentences by way of their verdicts much as they had in 
bygone eras) or the sentencing guidelines could no longer carry the force of law. The 
Supreme Court chose the latter; sentencing guidelines became advisory.78 
 In a watershed moment for the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial, Apprendi 
brought an end to more than two decades of determinate sentencing strictly controlled by 
legislatures and mandatory sentencing guidelines. The void, however, was filled not by 
juries but by expansive judicial discretion. Somewhere between when the penological 
sciences of the rehabilitative era first displaced jury sentencing and when the cold 
calculations of determinative sentencing proved unworkable, the criminal justice 
community lost trust in the jury. A mere four years after Apprendi, the momentum towards 
jury sentencing turned into nothing more than a swap-and-replace with judges. It is 
important to note, however, that the Apprendi line of cases was never about jury sentencing. 
It was simply about what sentencing-relevant facts the jury had to find while deciding guilt. 
Criminal defendants do not have a right under the Sixth Amendment to have their sentences 
imposed by juries.79 Interestingly, for most of our nation’s history, this fact was nothing 
more than an unarticulated assumption.80 It was not until 1986 when the Supreme Court 
first made it explicit (albeit with no significant historical discussion).81 Nevertheless, 
remnants of jury sentencing survive to this day.82 
 This short history of jury sentencing serves two purposes. First, it demonstrates that 
for jury sentencing advocates, the solution is statutory, not constitutional. The Sixth 
Amendment of course does not bar expanded jury sentencing, but it surely will not be its 
savior. Secondly, it shows that the decline of jury sentencing over the centuries has been 
for reasons that alone do not settle the debate around jury sentencing. Jury sentencing 
originated in America as a democratic check against judicial overreach and coercive state 
power. It was abandoned for an experiment with utilitarian ideas of rehabilitation. That 
experiment has since failed. Thus, today, the jury sentencing debate hinges exclusively on 
policy. 
 
77 Id. at 2163. 
78 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). The guidelines, even in advisory form, still retain 
some legal significance. For instance, the standard for appellate review of sentences is unreasonableness, 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, and a trial judge’s compliance with the guidelines affords their chosen sentence a 
presumption of reasonableness, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 340 (2007). 
79 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93. 
80 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (“The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to 
guarantee a right to a jury determination of that issue.”). 
81 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93 (“[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the 
sentence turns on specific findings of fact.”). As Judge Hoffman explains: “There was surprisingly little 
discussion of the right to a jury trial in the records of the constitutional debates, let alone any discussion of 
whether juries in criminal cases should continue the colonial practice of imposing sentences.” Hoffman, 
supra note 12, at 967. 
82 See supra note 9. 
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B.  Jury Sentencing Policy Arguments 
Proponents of jury sentencing tend to be in the minority. The federal government 
does not use juries for noncapital criminal sentencing, nor do forty-four of the fifty states.83 
Although history explains the growth of judicial sentencing, it does not justify the distrust 
of jury sentencing. Instead, resistance to jury sentencing is often supported by one of four 
propositions regarding jury competence: (1) jurors are more susceptible to prejudice than 
judges; (2) jury sentences are less uniform than those imposed by judges; (3) juries are 
harsher than judges; and (4) jury sentencing encourages compromise verdicts.84 
  While these criticisms of jury competence remain debatable, the question of their 
veracity is largely irrelevant to this Note’s proposal. The criminal advisory jury proposal, 
as will be discussed in Part III, results in nothing more than a non-binding sentencing 
recommendation. So, even if juries are truly more biased, inconsistent, or harsher than 
judges, the design mitigates these risks by preserving judicial sentencing autonomy. 
Similarly, additional procedural safeguards of the design address the concern that jury 
sentencing will encourage compromise verdicts. These procedural safeguards are also 
explained in Part III. 
 Although the criticisms of jury sentencing do not apply with equal force to criminal 
advisory juries, they do represent prevailing viewpoints. For this reason, it is worthwhile 
to address counterpoints. The first criticism regards the susceptibility of juries to prejudice. 
Any claim that juries are susceptible to prejudice requires acknowledging that judges are 
too. The rejection of the rehabilitative model in the 1970s was, in part, due to its perceived 
vulnerability to judicial prejudice.85 Of course, the criticism is not that judges are 
insusceptible to prejudice, it is that they are less susceptible than juries. However, social 
science does not support this notion.  
For instance, following Alabama’s abandonment of jury sentencing in 1978, one 
study compared the disparity between judge and jury sentences for robbery convictions. 
Researchers found no statistically significant race-based differences existed.86 Another 
study examined ordinary people’s views on appropriate punishment for actual crimes.87 
The study compared these views across different racial, gender, and educational groups 
and found that while different groups held different views on punishment, views within 
each group were remarkably consistent.88 The implication is that the risk of prejudice from 
one person, whose membership in a particular group may skew his or her viewpoint, may 
be less than the risk of prejudice from twelve people, whose memberships in different 
groups will force them to accommodate different viewpoints. 
 The second criticism regards jury inconsistency. The proposition is that jury 
sentencing is less uniform and hence more unpredictable than judicial sentencing. Here, 
the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Studies directly addressing the question have 
 
83 Id. 
84 Hoffman, supra note 12, at 985-86. 
85 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
86 Brent L. Smith & Edward H. Stevens, Sentence Disparity and the Judge-Jury Sentencing Debate: An 
Analysis of Robbery Sentences in Six Southern States, 9 CRIM. JUST. REV. 1, 3-6 (1984). 
87 Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convicted Offenders: An Analysis of the Public’s 
Views, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 223, 234-48 (1980). 
88 Id. 




achieved mixed results.89 At the very least, however, these studies do not bolster the claim 
that jury sentencing results in significantly more inconsistency than judicial sentencing.90 
Although a comparison of sentencing among all juries with sentencing among all judges 
is inconclusive, it is fair to presume that sentencing from an individual judge is more 
consistent (considering an individual jury never hears more than one case).91 Thus, the 
more pressing questions policymakers face are: one, what is the right balance between 
consistency and individualized treatment; and two, what level of consistency warrants 
exclusion of community participation.  
Finally, the third criticism regards jury harshness. Again, the proposition is that jury 
sentences are harsher than judge sentences. Research, again, reveals this to be specious. 
Quantitative comparisons of judge and jury sentence lengths must account for disparities 
between judge and jury sentencing procedures. In other words, a longer sentence may result 
not from a jury’s harsher propensity, but from informational and power inequities between 
judge and jury.92 For instance, juries in some states are not authorized the full range of 
sentencing options available to judges, such as probation or community service.93 Juries 
are also not always provided accurate information about parole eligibility and thus may 
overestimate release probabilities.94 Further, in some jury sentencing jurisdictions, 
statutory minimum sentences bind juries while not binding judges.95 All of these disparities 
increase the likelihood that a jury sentence will be harsher than a judge sentence.96 
Although jury sentences may be harsher than judge sentences for the reasons stated 
above, a large body of empirical evidence suggests that actual jurors are more lenient than 
judges.97 One observer explains: 
Researchers who delve more deeply than general survey and poll 
questions have discovered a paradox: When asked about sentencing in the 
abstract, citizens report a desire for harsher penalties, but when presented 
with detailed descriptions of cases, these same citizens often suggest more 
lenient penalties than those meted out by judges and, in many cases, than 
the mandatory minimum sanctions currently in force in their 
jurisdictions.98 
 
89 Adriaan Lanni, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 
YALE L.J. 1796-97 & n.100 (1999).  
90 Id. But see Smith, supra note 86, at 1 (concluding that “while states utilizing judge sentencing gave more 
consistent sentences from 1957 to 1977, recent trends indicate that the disparity in judge sentencing has 
risen to a level that approximates the disparity in jury-imposed sentences”). 
91 See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 987-88. 
92 Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 885, 888 (2004). 
93 Id. at 900. 
94 Id. at 899. 
95 Id. at 911. 
96 Id. at 888-89. 
97 See BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN & EDIE GREENE, THE JURY UNDER FIRE: MYTH, CONTROVERSY, AND REFORM 
286 (2017); Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency in Sentencing, 7 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 74-81 (1989); Hoffman, supra note 12, at 988-89; Lanni, supra note 89, at 1793-94. 
98 Lanni, supra note 89, at 1781. 
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The reason for this phenomenon, as behavioral research shows, is that laymen 
systematically misperceive the seriousness of the typical crime for a particular offense.99 
This misperception is caused in part by a media bias toward reporting the most heinous 
crimes and in part by a natural psychological tendency—known as the “availability 
heuristic”—that leads subjects to recall more easily stories of atypically severe crimes.100 
 So, there is a disconnect between the public’s general call for harsher penalties and 
citizens’ more lenient response when confronted with specific crimes. Unfortunately, this 
public call translates into an electoral preference for officials who are “tough on crime” 
and incentivizes legislative overenthusiasm for harsh punishment.101 The ultimate result is 
a sentencing scheme that is—from the perspective of citizens sitting in the jury box—
overly severe.102 
 To illustrate, consider a study by United States District Judge James Gwin of the 
Northern District of Ohio. Postulating that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were not 
reflective of community sentiment, Judge Gwin surveyed jurors in twenty-two criminal 
cases following their return of a guilty verdict.103 Judge Gwin asked each juror individually 
to recommend a punishment for the defendant they just convicted.104 Out of 261 total 
responses, 229 jurors (88%) recommended a sentence below the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines’ minimum for the offense.105 In fact, the jurors’ recommended sentence was on 
average less than half of the Guidelines’ minimum sentence and a third of the Guidelines’ 
maximum.106 Interestingly, jurors’ average recommended sentences were only longer than 
the Guidelines’ recommended sentence in white-collar cases.107  
 These white-collar cases involved criminal offenses akin to the following. In 
November 2019, a jury convicted Roger Stone—a longtime Republican operative and 
friend of President Donald Trump—of seven felony counts, including lying to authorities, 
obstructing a congressional investigation, and witness intimidation.108 In accordance with 
sentencing guidelines, federal prosecutors recommended a sentence of seven to nine years 
in prison.109 Before a sentence was imposed, however, President Trump publicly decried 
the recommended sentence as politically motivated and overly harsh.110 This instigated a 
national controversy, prompted the United States Attorney General to personally intervene 
and overrule his prosecutors’ recommendation, and led some to publicly accuse the judge 
 
99 See Loretta J. Stalans & Arthur J. Lurigio, Lay and Professionals' Beliefs About Crime and Criminal 
Sentencing: A Need for Theory, Perhaps Schema Theory, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 333, 342 (1990). 
100 See Loretta J. Stalans, Citizens' Crime Stereotypes, Biased Recall, and Punishment Preferences in 
Abstract Cases: The Educative Role of Interpersonal Sources, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 453, 468 
(1993). 
101 Lanni, supra note 89, at 1782. 
102 Id. at 1776. 
103 James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect 
Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 173, 174 (2010). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 188. 
106 Id. at 189. 
107 Id. 
108 Sharon LaFraniere, Roger Stone is Sentenced to Over 3 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2020, at 
A1. 
109 Peter Baker, Maggie Haberman & Sharon LaFraniere, Trump Commutes Sentence of Roger Stone in 
Case He Long Denounced, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2020, at A1. 
110 Id. 




in the case of being a Democratic activist (along with calls for her impeachment).111 
Ultimately, the judge—United States District Judge Amy Berman Jackson of the District 
of Columbia—imposed a three-and-a-half-year sentence.112 Yet, in the midst of the furor, 
at no point while Judge Jackson, the prosecutors, President Trump, and the national media 
were debating the fairness of Roger Stone’s sentence was the jury in the case asked what 
sentence they would consider fair. It presents an interesting hypothetical as to how the 
opinion of twelve anonymous citizens, affected only through civic duty and undistracted 
by extrinsic concerns, may have depoliticized the sentencing and quelled the public 
turmoil.   
In summary, although juries may issue harsher sentences than judges, this has less to 
do with punitive preferences and more to do with procedural sentencing disparities. 
Meanwhile, the notion that individual jurors are overly harsh is a myth. More disturbingly, 
both sentencing statutes and judicial sentences are largely detached, if not divergent, from 
community preference. Juries are inherently better than judges at reflecting the conscience 
of the community and expressing public outrage for the transgression of community norms. 
Yet today, in the vast majority of jurisdictions, juries have no say in sentencing. Defending 
herself against public accusations of unfairness in the Roger Stone case, Judge Jackson 
scoffed, saying “[T]he guidelines are harsh. I can assure you that defense attorneys and 
many judges have been making that point for a long time, but we don’t usually succeed in 
getting the government to agree.”113 Juries, on the other hand, may well agree. Thus, it is 
this Note’s contention that judges should start asking their opinion. 
II. HOW JURIES ARE CURRENTLY USED IN AN ADVISORY FORM 
Per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a formal advisory jury is a jury impaneled 
to provide a judge with non-binding recommendations in civil cases where the parties are 
not otherwise entitled to a jury.114 In practice, judges use formal advisory juries in 
exceptional cases to either affect procedural consistency or solicit community input.115 
However, other informal forms of advisory juries also exist. For instance, in the six states 
that use juries for noncapital criminal sentencing, all states but Texas allow the judge to 
override the jury sentence.116 Kentucky, for example, expressly holds their jury sentences 
 
111 Scott Morefield, Tucker Carlson Calls for Roger Stone Judge's Impeachment: “Democratic Activist 
Wearing Robes,” THE DAILY CALLER (Feb. 20, 2020, 10:21 PM), 
https://dailycaller.com/2020/02/20/tucker-carlson-amy-berman-jackson-roger-stone. 
112 Darren Samuelsohn & Josh Gerstein, Roger Stone Sentenced to Over 3 years in Prison, POLITICO (Feb. 
20, 2020, 4:33 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/20/roger-stone-sentenced-to-over-three-years-
in-prison-116326. 
113 Id. 
114 FED. R. CIV. P. 39(C). 
115 Note, Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1366, 1369 (1987). 
116 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-107 (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.070 (West 1974); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 557.036 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 928.1 (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 
(West 2007); 
see also Beasley v. State, 718 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. App. 1985) (“[O]nce a jury verdict assessing 
punishment has been received by the court and entered of record, the trial court is not entitled to change the 
verdict of the jury.” (citing Smith v. State, 479 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972))). 
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to be non-binding.117 Because ultimate judicial control is preserved in these states, their 
jury sentences are, in effect, advisory.  
Additionally, in rare cases, juries have also contributed to sentencing decisions in 
more unorthodox ways. In these cases, judges act outside express procedural authority to 
either direct jury sentencing participation (e.g., by polling juries’ opinions)118 or tolerate it 
(e.g., by permitting jury statements at sentencing hearings).119 Either way, the juries only 
provide advice. Accounting for these instances, as well as the formal advisory jury and 
non-binding state sentencing practices, a broad definition of an advisory jury includes any 
jury whose decisions on trial questions are not given determinative effect but are solicited 
or offered to guide a judge’s ultimate adjudication.  
With that definition in mind, an examination of the current practices of advisory 
juries (at least of those forms relevant to sentencing)120 will be helpful in developing a form 
suitable for use in noncapital criminal sentencing. This Part begins that examination with 
a discussion of the civil advisory jury, followed by an analysis of state jury sentencing in 
felony trials, and ends with a few examples of when informal advisory juries may arise in 
criminal sentencing. Building on this discussion, Part III follows with recommendations 
for a formal advisory jury suited for noncapital criminal sentencing. 
A.  Civil Advisory Juries 
Rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]n all actions not 
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue 
with an advisory jury . . .”121 Thus, in civil trials when the Seventh Amendment does not 
afford litigants a jury right,122 the court has the option to impanel an advisory jury. The 
practice is not a modern innovation; the use of advisory juries in civil court extends as far 
back as the fourteenth century.123 Historically, juries only served as formal fact finders in 
courts of law; however, in courts of equity, chancellors could impanel an advisory jury to 
assist in deciding cases.124 Upon the merger of law and equity in 1937, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure formally adopted the advisory jury,125 and most states have since 
followed suit.126 
 
117 See Murphy v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Ky. 2001) (stating that a jury’s sentencing 
recommendation has no mandatory effect). 
118 E.g., United States v. Collins, 828 F.3d 386, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2016). 
119 E.g., State v. Mahoney, 444 N.J. Super. 253, 258 (App. Div. 2016). 
120 For instance, the use of juries for Summary Jury Trials is a form of advisory jury not particularly 
relevant to this discussion. A Summary Jury Trial is an alternative dispute resolution method rather than a 
trial procedure. See generally Molly M. McNamara, Summary Jury Trials: Is There Authority for Federal 
Judges to Impanel Summary Jurors?, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 461 (1993). 
121 FED. R. CIV. P. 39(C). 
122 The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In Suits at common law, . . . the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. In 
practice, the Seventh Amendment protects a litigant's right to a jury trial only if the cause of action is legal 
in nature (as opposed to equitable) and it involves a matter of private right. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. 
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989). 
123 See Richard E. Guggenheim, A Note on the Advisory Jury in Federal Courts, 8 Fed. B. Ass'n J. 200, 200 
(1947). 
124 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 39.40[1] (3d ed. 1999). 
125 FED. R. CIV. P. 39. 
126 See, e.g., Ala. R. Civ. P. 39(c); Alaska R. Civ. P. 39(c); Ariz. R. Ct. 39(k); Ark. R. Civ. P. 39(c). 




Today, as it was historically, an advisory verdict from a civil advisory jury is not 
binding upon the court,127 but “is only part of the data taken into consideration in arriving 
at the court's independent conclusion.”128 When an advisory jury is used, the case is still 
formally tried before the judge, who must enter findings of both law and fact.129 The 
decision to use an advisory jury, as well as their management once impaneled, is not subject 
to any formal constraints or guidelines.130 Thus, given that a judge has absolute discretion 
to call, manage, and disregard a civil advisory jury, the advisory jury presents essentially 
no issues for appellate review.131 For these reasons, judges are not obligated to (and rarely 
do) explain why they are calling civil advisory juries in the first place.132 
 Although judges are not required to explain their rationale for impaneling an 
advisory jury, the practice is generally utilized for two reasons: procedural consistency or 
community involvement.133 The first rationale—procedural consistency—may be present 
when the line between law and equity is seen as arbitrary, irrationally resulting in a jury 
right for legal controversies but not for analogous equitable controversies.134 For instance, 
a jury right would exist in a legal action stemming from a contract dispute, but not for an 
equitable action stemming from a deed or promissory note.135 Also, an action for damages 
would confer a jury right if the case was brought in a court of law but not for the same 
action brought in an admiralty court.136 In these situations, advisory juries may be desirable 
as a means to affect procedural consistency. Advisory juries may also provide consistency 
(and avoid disparate treatment of co-defendants) in complex cases involving co-defendants 
with common evidence but unequal jury rights (e.g., if a private party and the United States 
government were joined as co-defendants).137  
The second rationale—community involvement—may be present when community 
opinion is sought to support rulings in highly-charged litigation.138 An example of this is 
the civil lawsuit brought in the wake of the 1993 tragedy in Waco, Texas.139 The infamous 
incident involved a siege by federal law enforcement agents of a compound owned by cult 
leader David Koresh.140 As law enforcement attempted to breach the compound, it caught 
 
127 Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238, 240 (1893) (“But such verdict is not binding upon the judgment of the 
court. It is advisory simply, and the court may disregard it entirely, or adopt it either partially or in toto.”). 
128 Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), remedy modified on other grounds, 
588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978). 
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
130 See Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 79 NW. U.L. REV. 1097, 1103 (1984). 
131 Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 14 (4th Cir. 1972); American Lumbermens Mut. Casualty 
Co. v. Timms & Howard, 108 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1939). 
132 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2335 (5th ed. 
2019). 
133 Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, supra note 115, at 1366, 1369. 
134 Id. at 1366. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1366-67. 
137 Id. at 1369. 
138 Matthew L. Zabel, Advisory Juries and Their Use and Misuse in Federal Tort Claims Act Cases, 2003 
BYU L. REV. 186-87, 222 (2003). 
139 Andrade v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 778 (W.D. Tex. 2000). 
140 Sam Howe Verhovek, Scores Die as Cult Compound Is Set Afire After F.B.I. Sends in Tanks with Tear 
Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at A1. 
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fire.141 The flames quickly engulfed the entire structure and resulted in the deaths—all 
televised on national media—of nearly eighty men, women, and children.142 The 
subsequent lawsuit sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which authorized 
suit against the United States but forbade the jury right in such actions.143 Although the 
trial was a bench trial, due to the publicity the incident received and the controversy and 
public outrage it spawned, the federal district judge impaneled an advisory jury per Rule 
39(c) as a means to legitimize the judge’s ruling.144 Ultimately, both the judge and the 
advisory jury held the United States not liable for any of the deaths.145 
Although the advisory verdict is not binding on the court, the use of an advisory jury 
is not without consequence. Compared to a bench trial, jury trials impose additional 
procedural costs that cause increased delays and expenses for the court and litigants 
alike.146 For instance, jury trials must be conducted in one continuous block of time 
whereas bench trials may be scheduled in segments around a court’s other business.147 
Jurors require voir dire, and once selected, induce logistical complications associated with 
managing them.148 Moreover, the nature of the trial itself changes when a jury—even an 
advisory one—is involved. Without a jury, the presentation of evidence can be streamlined, 
and the rules of evidence are typically less contentious.149 Opening and closing statements 
are not needed and some live testimony may be replaced by written form.150 Further, 
because a jury is a materially different audience than a trial judge, court presentations are 
approached differently by counsel.151 This holds true even when the jury is only advisory 
given that attorneys recognize the advisory jury’s persuasive force.152  By some estimates, 
these additional procedural considerations cause a trial to run twice as long with a jury than 
with a judge alone.153 And, although made-for-jury presentations are not inherently worse 
than made-for-judge presentations, the simple fact that there is a change demonstrates that 
the advisory jury, despite being subject to the judge’s absolute control and discretion, is 
not inconsequential at trial.154 
 In addition to the procedural consequences of advisory juries, there are substantive 




143 See Zabel, supra note 138, at 187. 
144 Paul Duggan, More Upset Than Interested, Waco Awaits Replay in Court: As Branch Davidian 
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verdict is optional and non-determinative, juries may become apathetic to their duties.156 
In theory, an advisory jury who believes their decision lacks consequence may deliberate 
or consider less before reaching a verdict. This perception of the advisory jury as apathetic 
to its duties undermines an advisory’s persuasive force. It also delegitimizes any verdict 
from a judge perceived to have been swayed by the advisory.157 Second, advisory jurors 
who perceive their role as unnecessary or irrelevant may become disillusioned with their 
personal sacrifice to serve. Asking jurors to take off work or arrange child care merely to 
give non-binding advice risks stirring public resentment for jury duty in general.158 Finally, 
advisory juries always introduce an additional risk for judges who may ultimately have to 
rule against them.159 Most judges are surely not eager to openly disregard community 
viewpoints in a case after voluntarily soliciting them.160 
 In summary, as just one, non-binding factor a judge may consider to independently 
decide a case, the civil advisory jury is a useful way to solicit community input without 
relinquishing any judicial decision-making authority. And, when the actual verdict and the 
advisory verdict are aligned, civil advisory juries help legitimize the outcome. However, 
this comes at the cost of significant procedural inefficiencies—the same inefficiencies, at 
least to some extent, that are present in regular jury trials. Further, the non-binding nature 
of the advisory verdict creates risks that jurors will be less thorough in their duties and less 
appreciative of serving. And, when actual verdicts and advisory verdicts end up not 
aligning, a civil advisory jury may do more harm than good to the legal system’s 
legitimacy. 
B.  States with Noncapital Criminal Jury Sentencing 
 Only six states allow for jury sentencing in noncapital felony cases: Arkansas, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.161 In all of these jurisdictions, juries 
select their sentence from within a legislatively defined statutory range, which in some 
cases can be permissively broad.162 Beyond this, the particulars of each states’ sentencing 




157 Id. at 219-24. 
158 Public perception of jury duty generally tends to be negative. Prospective jurors often perceive jury duty 
as time consuming, financially burdensome, culturally biased, mired in formality and legal complexity, or 
the blameworthy source of unpopular verdicts. These unflattering portrayals of jury duty engender 
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approximately 10% of summoned jurors reported for jury selection. Public perception notwithstanding, 
empirical studies show that for most jurors who actually serve, the experience is surprisingly satisfying. 
Nonetheless, of the jurors who are dissatisfied with their experience, inconvenience is the leading cause, 
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19, 21, 24. 
159 Zabel, supra note 138, at 220. 
160 See King, supra note 92, at 941. 
161 See supra note 9. 
162 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.011 (West 2017) (Missouri recognizes five classes of felonies carrying 
ranges of ten to thirty, five to fifteen, three to ten, zero to seven, and zero to four years.); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 12.32 (West 2009) (The statutory punishment range for first degree felonies in Texas is five to 
ninety-nine years imprisonment.). 
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[S]tates differ as to whether or not trial is bifurcated into guilt and 
punishment phases; whether or not the prosecutor can veto a defendant's 
choice to be sentenced by a judge instead of jury; whether or not judicial 
sentencing is bounded by sentencing guidelines; which felony offenses and 
offenders may be sentenced by juries; which sentencing options are 
available to jurors; whether or not the sentences that juries impose are 
subject to parole; and what information jurors are permitted to learn about 
punishment options, the offense, and the offender.163 
Evaluations of state jury sentencing schemes frequently involve comparisons of judge and 
jury sentences;164 and the variations that King and Noble summarize distort these 
comparisons.165 Regardless, for the purposes of this Note, it is not necessary to analyze in 
detail the various procedures used to implement jury sentencing and their consequences. 
Instead, three generalizations suffice: first, in some states that use juries to sentence in 
noncapital cases, jury sentences are viewed as harsher than judge sentences;166 second, in 
these same states, judges retain the authority to modify jury sentences;167 and third, these 
judges rarely do.168 Thus, for an advisory jury proposal premised on the retention of 
independent judicial decision-making authority, the relevant issue is why judges do not 
exercise their discretion to correct harsh jury sentences.  
 One reason may be the default effect. In five of the six states that allow jury 
sentencing, a jury’s sentence forms the presumptive ruling.169 However, the procedural 
requirements to overcome this presumption are not necessarily prohibitive. In Virginia, for 
instance, if a judge wants to modify a jury sentence, the judge “shall file with the record of 
the case a written explanation of such modification including the cause therefor.”170 In 
Arkansas it is even easier. There, the trial court may reduce a jury’s sentence without 
providing written justification.171 And in Kentucky, the fact that the jury sentence is 
characterized as non-binding implicates unbounded judicial authority to depart from it.172 
Yet, despite the relative procedural ease with which a judge may modify a jury sentence,173 
doing so still requires some additional cognitive effort. This effort creates a psychological 
 
163 King, supra note 92, at 891-92. 
164 BORNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 275. 
165 King, supra note 92. 
166 This generalization is based on studies of jury sentencing in Arkansas, Kentucky, Virginia, and—more 
narrowly—El Paso, Texas. King, supra note 92, at 895; Weninger, supra note 15, at 31; see also King, 
supra note 92, at 888-89 (discussing how procedural variations in jury sentencing practices may account 
for their harsher sentences). 
167 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-107 (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.070 (West 1974); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 557.036 (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 928.1 (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 
(West 2007). 
168 See King, supra note 92, at 940-46. King and Noble’s conclusion that judges rarely modify jury 
sentences relate only to their study of jury sentencing in Kentucky and Arkansas. 
169 See supra note 116. 
170 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (West 2007). 
171 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-107 (West 2015). 
172 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
173 Comparatively, the common-law standard allowing for remittitur or additur (procedures whereby a 
judge alters a jury award of civil damages) requires that the jury award of civil damages be so high or so 
low that it “shock[s] the conscience.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 422 (1996). 




inertia (often referred to the “default effect” or nudge theory)174 to sticking with the default; 
in this case, whatever the jury decided. 
 While judges may be subconsciously inclined to stick with the default, another 
explanation of why they rarely modify jury sentences is that they consciously favor 
deference. Judges in some jury sentencing states see the jury as perfectly capable of 
deciding the sentencing question.175 Others view jury sentencing as “a welcome respite 
from a morally uncomfortable chore.”176 Alternatively, elected judges face the pressure of 
upsetting their electorate and are therefore cautious of public perception.177 These judges 
may be afraid of appearing “soft on crime” by lowering a jury sentence or may simply 
believe that jury deference helps maintain a positive community reputation.178 
Hypothetically in these environments, a newspaper headline along the lines of “Judge Cuts 
Assailant’s Jury Sentence in Half” would understandably be unwelcome attention.179 
 One final explanation for the lack of judicial modification is that the jury 
sentence—or more accurately, the threat of a harsh jury sentence—helps manage the court 
docket. The theory is that without the prospect of severe jury sentences, the perceived risk 
of jury trial will decrease, consequently decreasing plea rates, and jury trials will 
overwhelm the court.180 Thus, on principle and in order to disincentivize jury trials, judges 
may refuse to modify jury sentences to effectively discourage defendants from believing 
the judge will fix a jury’s harsh sentence if their choice to seek a jury trial turns out poor.181 
 The lack of judicial modification in jury sentencing states may therefore be 
explained by any combination of (1) a cognitive ease leading judges to accept the jury 
sentence as the default, (2) a preference for jury deference for either principled reasons 
(jurors are better suited to decide normative questions) or pragmatic ones (to avoid 
upsetting an electorate), and (3) docket management incentives. Of course, modification 
 
174 See generally P.G. Hansen, What is Nudging?, BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND POLICY ASSN. (Aug. 16, 
2016), https://behavioralpolicy.org/what-is-nudging/. 
175 Interviews with judges in Kentucky and Arkansas produced the following representative responses: 
“The jury knows everything about the defendant that I know. They find out his criminal record, they hear 
the victim impact evidence, they hear the evidence of the crime during trial just like I have. I go along with 
their collective judgment.”; “Juries do a good job with most of these cases in this circuit. It is important to 
defer to the jury of twelve citizens in that a jury's sentencing verdict will usually reflect appropriate 
punishment within the community for certain criminal conduct.”; “Juries have a pretty good sense of what 
is fair. . . . It seems to work well for us.”; “Sentencing is literally power over liberty. The people should 
have that power. I believe that the choice of submitting the sentencing decision to the people should belong 
to the defendant, and to the prosecution. Otherwise, it concentrates too much power in the hands of the 
government.” King, supra note 92, at 941 n.177. 
176 King, supra note 92, at 944. 
177 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002); see also Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 789 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (“Elected judges cannot help being aware that if the public is not satisfied with 
the outcome of a particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects.” (citing Stephen B. Bright & 
Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next 
Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 793-94 (1995)); Fred B. Burnside, Comment, Dying to Get 
Elected: A Challenge to the Jury Override, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1017 (1999) (discussing judicial fear of 
public persecution and the influence politics plays in decisions to overrule a jury’s life sentence in capital 
cases). 
178 See King, supra note 92, at 943. 
179 See also id. at 941. 
180 Id. at 944. 
181 Id. 
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may also be rare because it is not necessary, i.e., because jury sentences are commensurate 
with judge sentences.182 The proposals advanced here, however, deliberately avoid resting 
on that argument. The proposal for a criminal advisory jury instead must address the 
foregoing impediments to judicial modification, even if the problem modification is meant 
to address is itself exceptionally rare.  
C.  Informal Advisory Juries Used in Criminal Sentencing 
 Beyond the few states that already include juries in an advisory form in their 
criminal sentencing procedures, criminal advisory juries occasionally occur in judge-only 
sentencing schemes. On these occasions, the form the advisory jury takes is defined by a 
particular judge’s idiosyncratic preference or the circumstances in which the jury’s advice 
originates. Beyond the idea that these instances are completely dependent on a judge’s 
proactive initiation or willing concession, generalizations are difficult to make because the 
instances are rare and take on a variety of forms. Nevertheless, two anecdotes are 
instructive for conceiving the contours of a formal criminal advisory jury. 
 The first case involves a federal district judge proactively surveying a criminal jury 
for a recommended sentence. In United States v. Collins, federal prosecutors appealed a 
sentence based on the district judge’s use of a jury poll following the conclusion of the 
trial.183 The case involved the conviction of a Dayton, Ohio man whose confiscated 
computer was found to include nineteen videos and ninety-three images of child 
pornography.184 The jury found the defendant guilty of both possession and distribution of 
child pornography, and the defendant’s calculated sentencing guidelines range was twenty-
two to twenty-seven years (above the statutory twenty-year maximum for the offenses).185 
After the verdict but before the sentencing, however, the judge  
polled the jury to ask them . . . “State what you believe an appropriate 
sentence is.” Jurors' responses ranged from zero to 60 months' incarceration, 
with a mean of 14.5 months and median of 8 months. With one exception, 
every juror recommended a sentence less than half of the five-year 
mandatory minimum accompanying defendant's offenses. . . . [T]he district 
judge considered the jury poll as “one factor” in fashioning defendant's 
sentence, noting that it “reflect[s] . . . how off the mark the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines are.” After discussing numerous [other] sentencing 
factors, . . . the district judge varied downward, sentencing defendant to 
concurrent mandatory minimum terms of five years' imprisonment.186 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the sentence.187 In doing so, the circuit reasoned that 
although the district judge cited just desert as the most important sentencing factor, the 
judge also considered the defendant's lack of prior convictions, absence of alcohol or drug 
 
182 See Lanni, supra note 89, at 1793-94. 
183 Collins, 828 F.3d at 387-88. 
184 Id. at 388. 
185 Collins, 828 F.3d at 387-88. The defendant’s actual calculated sentencing guidelines range equated to 
262 to 327 months. The range in months was converted to years and rounded to whole numbers in order to 
simplify comparison. 
186 Id. at 388. 
187 Id. at 391. 




abuse, college degree, regular employment, close family ties, and financial responsibility 
as factors supporting a lighter sentence.188 Ultimately, the court held that because the jury 
recommendation was in no way controlling—it “did not conflict with the district judge’s 
duty or ability to . . . independently craft an appropriate sentence”—the sentence was not 
substantively unreasonable.189 
A second case provides a valuable juxtaposition. In State v. Mahoney, the defendant, 
charged with first-degree murder for shooting and killing his father, claimed he suffered 
from battered child syndrome as a consequence of his father’s physical and emotional 
abuse.190 Based in part on sympathy for the defendant, the jury returned a verdict 
convicting the defendant of a lesser charge of first-degree aggravated manslaughter.191 
Along with the verdict, however, two individual jurors also wrote letters to both the judge 
and the defendant indicating their preference that the defendant receive therapy instead of 
punishment and their desire to read a statement at sentencing.192 The judge permitted the 
jurors to read the statement at sentencing and the State appealed.193 In reversing the trial 
judge for abuse of discretion, the appellate division clarified that it is a permissible exercise 
of discretion to allow defense family members or victims to speak at sentencing.194 
However, the jurors had no relevant information to add for judicial consideration because 
they were limited to addressing the same evidence presented in front of the judge at trial.195 
Further, allowing the jurors to speak at sentencing and to advocate for aggravating or 
mitigating factors undermined their role as fact finders.196 
In both Collins and Mahoney, the trial judge permitted the jury to voice their views 
on appropriate punishment despite having no formal role in sentencing. In Collins, the jury 
participation was permissible; but in Mahoney, it was reversable error. The opposite 
outcomes reflect stark differences in how the informal jury advisories were issued. The 
jury poll in Collins was conducted immediately following the verdict, and it simply 
recommended a length of incarceration. It included neither juror commentary on 
alternative, rehabilitative punishment nor expressions of empathy for either the defendant 
or victim.197 Because of this, the juror opinions could reasonably be characterized as the 
jury’s assessment of just desert for the criminal conduct presented at trial, free of influence 
from aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors. The trial judge in Collins was able to 
weigh this indication of just desert with the information presented at sentencing in order to 
come to an independent conclusion.198 The juror recommendation permitted in Mahoney, 
on the other hand, did not focus on retribution for the criminal conduct. Rather, the 
recommendation was an alternative opinion speaking directly to the defendant’s mitigating 
factors.199 Thus, instead of weighing the recommendation as one factor in sentencing, the 
 
188 Id. at 390-91. 
189 Id. at 390. 
190 Mahoney, 444 N.J. Super. at 256. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 256-57. 
193 Id. at 258. 
194 Id. at 258-59. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 260. 
197 Collins, 828 F.3d at 388. 
198 Id. at 390. 
199 Mahoney, 444 N.J. Super. at 256-57, 260. 
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trial judge in Mahoney was impermissibly influenced by particular jurors’ impassioned 
pleas on how the judge himself should weigh the mitigating factors. Notably, the Collins 
poll also represented opinions from each individual juror, whereas only two of the twelve 
jurors spoke at sentencing in Mahoney.200 
Of the two cases, Collins clearly represents the preferred lodestar for developing a 
criminal advisory jury. In Collins, community sentiment was solicited to form one factor 
in the judge’s independent sentencing decision without fundamentally changing any 
procedural aspect of the trial or sentencing hearing. The Collins example, however, is not 
without fault. First, the cursory juror poll conducted in Collins shares the same risk of juror 
apathy that is present with civil advisory juries. Second, simply averaging individual juror 
responses is an inherently weaker decision-making product than a product of juror 
deliberation and collective agreement. For instance, the act of deliberation, by merging 
different juror viewpoints, backgrounds, and experiences, reduces individual juror biases, 
increases overall jury comprehension of evidence and court instructions (thereby resulting 
in more accurate factfinding), and generates legitimacy for the jury’s decision.201 Finally, 
because the informal advisory sentence in Collins was only made possible through the 
judge’s personal initiative, there is little reason to believe that the practice will become 
widespread. Only by formalizing the criminal advisory jury will its use become normalized 
and its potential systematic benefits become possible. Thus, the recommendations in the 
succeeding Part aim to address these deficiencies. 
III. PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF THE CRIMINAL ADVISORY JURY 
 This Note now turns to the proposal for a formal criminal advisory jury for use in 
noncapital sentencing. The previous examples of advisory juries guide the discussion by 
illustrating the vices and virtues of analogous systems. This Part proceeds by first 
discussing when within the normal criminal process a criminal advisory jury should be 
used and the benefits such deliberate placement will afford. The discussion then moves to 
how a court should facilitate an advisory sentence and subsequently how a jury should 
deliberate on one. Finally, the benefits of the criminal advisory jury are summarized, 
including the benefits which will derive even if the prediction that an advisory sentence 
will influence (but not control) a judge-made sentence proves false. 
A.  The Advisory Sentence’s Place in the Criminal Process 
The starting point for the proposal is a discussion of when within the normal criminal 
process the criminal advisory jury should be used. As alluded to at the end of Part II, this 
Note proposes that the criminal advisory jury become a formal, automatic feature of all 
noncapital jury trials. The criminal advisory jury is not, however, an additional jury. It is 
merely a new role regular criminal juries should play following their issuance of a guilty 
verdict. Unlike the civil advisory jury, which is optionally impaneled in cases where the 
civil jury right does not exist, the criminal advisory jury should be a feature attached to the 
 
200 Collins, 828 F.3d at 388; Mahoney, 444 N.J. Super. at 258. 
201 Iontcheva, supra note 3, at 348-49, 364. Because jury deliberations regularly occur in secret, the positive 
effects of deliberation are difficult to demonstrate. However, one illustration (albeit fictional) is provided 
by the classic 1957 movie 12 Angry Men wherein each member of the jury, who were wrong in their initial 
judgment, were eventually led to the right decision because one juror insisted on deliberation. 12 ANGRY 
MEN (United Artists 1957). 




criminal jury right. In this vein, the criminal advisory jury should not be waivable during 
jury trials, nor should it be available during bench trials (as is the case with civil advisory 
juries when no jury right exists). This will ensure that, when a defendant seeks a jury trial, 
the criminal advisory jury is used consistently throughout the jurisdiction and, when a 
defendant seeks a bench trial, the court is not procedurally burdened with managing a jury 
it is not already otherwise managing.  
Crucially, the point in the trial process in which criminal juries should advise on the 
sentence is after the verdict but before the sentencing hearing. Isolating the jury from the 
normal sentencing hearing serves many key functions. First, by dismissing the jury 
following the verdict, the sentencing hearing itself may remain unchanged. The current 
practice of scheduling the sentencing hearing a couple of weeks from the conclusion of 
trial affords the court time to develop a pre-sentencing report and affords each party time 
to marshal the elements of its case which were inadmissible during trial. This delay would 
be administratively prohibitive if the jury were to remain impaneled through the end of the 
sentencing hearing.202  
Second, the information presented at the sentencing hearing would unduly 
complicate the jury’s role. Experience from capital sentencing shows that the weighing of 
mitigating and aggravating factors is often one of the most befuddling tasks for a jury.203 
In capital cases, these factors are weighed in order to determine whether a death sentence 
is just desert.204 In noncapital cases, however, the sentencing factors tend to serve more 
utilitarian purposes.205 A judge may use sentencing information to assess the rehabilitative 
or deterrent effect of incarceration and evaluate whether alternative forms of punishment, 
such as parole, electronic monitoring, or community service, are appropriate.206 A judge’s 
institutional knowledge of these forms of alternative punishment and his or her first-hand 
experience overseeing their use with a variety of defendants places the judge in a superior 
position to consider them.207 On the other hand, a jury, as the conscience of the community, 
is best positioned to decide just desert for the particular criminal acts committed.208 If the 
jury’s advisory sentence is characterized as just desert for the crime rather than for the 
criminal, the advisory sentence will be more readily comparable across different cases and 
the information presented at the sentencing hearing will not be needed for the advisory 
sentence’s determination. Thus, isolating the advisory sentence from influence by 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances not only simplifies the jury’s task, but helps to 
establish a retributivist baseline for the underlying crime.  
 
202 See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1005 n.188 (discussing how substantial delays between verdict and 
sentencing would be unworkable in a jury-sentencing system). 
203 See BORNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 227. 
204 Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[R]etribution provides the main justification for capital 
punishment . . .”).  
205 Gwin, supra note 103, at 181 (arguing that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines disfavor judicial 
consideration of utilitarian sentencing factors, such as those often presented in sentencing hearings, e.g., a 
defendant’s education, employment background, family ties, drug dependence, etc.). 
206 See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1005-06. 
207 Id. 
208 Ring, 536 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In respect to retribution, jurors possess an important 
comparative advantage over judges. In principle, they are more attuned to the community's moral 
sensibility . . . and [are] better able to determine . . . the need for retribution . . .”). 
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Third, by intentionally removing the jury from the sentencing hearing, the advisory 
sentence will be more readily treated as merely one factor to be weighed by the judge, 
rather than a separate decision a judge must accept or rebut. Because the jury’s picture of 
the circumstances is necessarily incomplete, it prevents the advisory sentence, through 
either judicial ease or deference, from becoming the de facto sentence. Surely it would be 
an abuse of discretion for a judge to rely solely on an advisory sentence proposed without 
the benefit of a sentencing hearing. In this sense, the advisory sentence will be more akin 
to the jury poll used in Collins and far less resistant to judicial modification than jury 
sentences in the state sentencing schemes previously discussed. 
B.  Facilitating the Advisory Sentence 
Arguably the most important feature of this proposal is how the advisory sentence 
will be issued. Although the advisory sentence is to be issued prior to the sentencing 
hearing, it should not be issued contemporaneously with the verdict. Instead, the verdict 
and advisory sentence should be issued separately but in immediate succession by the same 
jury. Bifurcating the deliberation of guilt and punishment is an important feature in current 
jury sentencing schemes designed to prevent facts relevant only to punishment from unduly 
influencing decisions on guilt.209 Even though the jury will not participate in the sentencing 
hearing, dividing jury decisions on guilt and punishment into two separate deliberations 
remains beneficial. On this point, Mahoney provides insight. In that case, the jury issued a 
compromise verdict: rather than finding for murder, the jury convicted on a lesser charge 
of manslaughter in order to accommodate the sympathies of (at least) two jurors.210 Thus, 
even though the Mahoney jury played no role in sentencing, the consequences of a murder 
conviction weighed heavily on their finding of guilt. Simply asking juries to ignore 
punishment while deciding guilt is not sufficient to prevent jury contemplation—even 
speculative contemplation—of a guilty verdict’s consequences. Jury nullification arises out 
of this same reality. In the rare cases of jury nullification, juries deliberately subvert the 
truth to declare a defendant not guilty because they disagree with the anticipated 
punishment.  
In truth, juries think about punishment while deciding guilt regardless of any formal 
role in sentencing.211 Bifurcating the verdict and the advisory sentence into two separate 
deliberations helps mitigate this fact. If, during guilt deliberation, jurors could anticipate 
having a chance to voice their thoughts on punishment, their concerns about the 
consequences of a conviction could comfortably be set aside while they dispassionately 
evaluate guilt. The Mahoney jury may have been less inclined to bend the truth by finding 
for manslaughter instead of murder if it had known they could recommend a sentence 
 
209 See Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1004. 
210 Due to the secrecy surrounding jury deliberations, conclusions that a verdict represents compromise are 
frequently nothing more than speculation. In Mahoney, however, letters written by certain jurors revealed 
the mental impressions of the jury, and thus the court was able to definitively label the verdict a 
compromise. 444 N.J. Super. at 257-58. 
211 See BORNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 299, for a discussion on how capital juries might weigh the possibility 
of the death penalty during their guilt deliberations even despite bifurcation. Comparatively, civil juries are 
known to speculate on factors which are routinely excluded from their purview. For instance, one study 
conducted in 2000 concluded that 77% of civil jurors interviewed after trial reported discussing attorney 
fees, often going as far as specifying the amount; an average of 21% discussed whether the plaintiff’s 
insurance would cover expenses, and 40% discussed the defendant’s insurance situation. Id. at 194-95. 




commensurate with their moral understanding of the offense. Thus, jury compromises 
during the guilt stage should decrease if jurors are given the opportunity to voice their 
views on punishment separately. 
Additionally, bifurcation simplifies jury deliberation. Jury instructions are a well-
recognized source of jury confusion.212 Although it is intuitive to believe additional 
sentence-relevant instructions added onto the initial conviction-relevant instructions will 
increase the likelihood that juries will further misunderstand their duties, empirical studies 
suggest that longer instructions merely correlate with longer deliberations, not increased 
confusion.213 Nevertheless, issuing sentencing instructions separate from the conviction 
instructions can minimize instruction-based confusion.214  
Some transparency in the initial conviction instructions will convey to the jury that 
it will indeed have a role in sentencing if sentencing becomes necessary.215 For instance, a 
statement at the end of the conviction instructions might read: 
If you return a guilty verdict, then and only then, you will be asked by the 
court to immediately return to the deliberation room and provide a statement 
of what punishment you feel is appropriate for the crime committed. Further 
instruction will be given at that time. Until that time, your focus should 
remain on applying the law to the facts and objectively evaluating guilt. Any 
discussion or consideration of appropriate punishment should be saved for 
the separate sentencing deliberation if indeed the determination of a 
sentence becomes necessary due to a finding of guilt.  
Such an instruction will convey to the jury that it will have an opportunity to voice 
sentiments on punishment without muddying the task at hand: deciding guilt. The 
instructions that eventually preempt the advisory sentence deliberation should instruct 
juries to recommend, at a minimum, a term length of actual incarceration. Juries may 
additionally recommend an alternative, non-custodial sentence (or a sentence comprised of 
both custodial and non-custodial elements). However, this alternative should be offered 
along with, not in lieu of, incarceration. For example, if a jury’s preferred punishment is 
community service, the instructions should require the jury to also recommend a 
commensurate prison sentence, even if a diminutive term length is necessary to reflect the 
jury’s preferences. This instruction—requiring juries to recommend a purely custodial 
sentence irrespective of their non-custodial preference—ensures that each advisory 
sentence will translate to uniform, quantifiable terms comparable across all cases. The 
judge may then incorporate both the absolute and relative import of the jury’s 
recommendation into his or her own final sentencing decision. 
The question remains of how exactly a jury is expected to come up with a number 
that represents just desert. Setting aside the fact that civil juries are trusted to do exactly 
that when courts ask them to determine punitive damages, there is a real concern that 
 
212 Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury 
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1605 (2012). 
213 Id. at 1557. 
214 Id. at 1598 (discussing how the structure of jury instructions, which often resemble a patchwork of 
different pieces confusingly sewn together, is one source of jury miscomprehension). 
215 Id. at 1599-1600 (discussing how jury instruction omissions, arising from the court’s unwillingness to 
confront the realities of what jurors know and expect, is one source of jury miscomprehension).   
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without guidance or experience in sentencing, a jury’s recommendation will be erratic, 
inconsistent, or random.216 These concerns highlight why the advisory sentence must be 
non-binding. Regardless, one solution would be to provide the jury the same sentencing 
guidelines that the judge receives (albeit in simplified form). This idea, however, as well 
as any alternative that provides the jury with guidance, risks tainting the advisory sentence 
with anchoring bias—a cognitive effect that biases decision-making toward initial pieces 
of information.217 Because the advisory jury is intended to represent the conscience of the 
community, principled adherence to the idea that their sentence should be based on nothing 
more than their conscience is crucial. This blank-slate approach might sound arbitrary, but 
sentencing guidelines themselves include the same subjective value judgements, just from 
a different source.218 And, if advisory jury sentences are ever intended to validate 
sentencing guidelines, the guidelines cannot form the basis for their own validation. 
 Finally, the additional sentencing deliberation will no doubt impose additional time 
commitments on the court, although it is only speculation as to how significant this 
additional time may be. One could argue that after a jury has settled on a unanimous 
decision of guilt, any further deliberation by the same jury to propose an advisory sentence 
will be relatively undemanding, especially because the jury is not being asked to consider 
any new information not already presented to it at trial. Still, a jury that hangs while 
attempting to decide on an advisory sentence would be rather vexing to a court given that 
the advisory sentence is only that: advisory. One solution to mitigate the potential for a 
hung jury at the advisory sentencing stage is to allow the advisory sentence to be less than 
unanimous.219  
Requiring only a 10-2 or 11-1 consensus rather than a unanimous consensus on 
appropriate punishment will expedite the sentencing deliberation.220 Furthermore, the jury 
will have the ability to exclude a juror who is exceptionally harsh or exceptionally 
lenient.221 In other words, the advisory sentence will not have to skew to accommodate 
lone wild cards (to reiterate, the guilt decision still requires unanimous agreement). In some 
 
216 See generally BORNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 271; Hoffman, supra note 12, at 987. 
217 See BORNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 192-93, for a discussion on how damage caps and ad damnum create 
an anchoring effect on civil juries and alter their awards of compensatory damages. Ad damnum, in civil 
cases, represents the amount of damages a plaintiff asks for (i.e., how much they believe they deserve). Id. 
218 For instance, while creating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1984, the Sentencing Commission was 
instructed to “consider the community view of the gravity of the offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4). In 
actually developing the sentencing ranges, however, the Sentencing Commission analyzed sentences 
imposed in 10,000 previous cases. Gwin, supra note 103, at 185. In other words, the Sentencing 
Commission simply considered the judge view of the gravity of the offense rather than, as proposed here, 
the jury view. 
219 Of course, hung juries may also be mitigated by simply polling the jurors individually, as was done in 
Collins. 828 F.3d at 388. The added benefits of deliberation, however, are worth the small price to pay in 
additional time.  
220 In general, non-unanimous decision rules are less desirable than unanimous decision rules because, 
although they decrease deliberation time, they also lead to less thorough analysis of the evidence (and 
consequently, less accurate decisions), exclusion of holdouts’ and racial and ethnic minorities’ voices, and 
less satisfaction and confidence with the verdict among all jurors. However, these negative effects are 
typically not present with decisions on punitive damages. With punitive damage decisions, unanimous 
decision rules actually lead to more extreme punitive awards when compared with non-unanimous decision 
rules because juries operating under unanimous decision rules must accommodate any outliers. BORNSTEIN, 
supra note 97, at 80-81. 
221 Id. 




sense, this non-unanimous scheme does risk undermining the advisory sentence’s 
mitigating effect on compromise verdicts. For example, under the proposed scheme, a 
would-be hold-out juror who may otherwise wish to nullify at the guilt stage may be 
dissuaded from doing so by the prospect of the opportunity to offer a correspondingly 
diminutive advisory sentence. If, however, that hold-out understands that the other jurors 
are not beholden to accommodate their exceptional sentencing viewpoint by way of a non-
unanimous decision rule, nullification is re-incentivized. For this reason, the fact that the 
sentencing decision will not need to be unanimous should be kept from the jury until the 
sentencing instructions are issued.222 
C.  Summary of Primary and Secondary Benefits 
 The core concept of the criminal advisory jury is that it is not binding on the court. 
Thus, it allows for community sentiment to be expressed through a punishment 
recommendation while preserving the traditional judicial authority in doling out sentences. 
Excluding the advisory jury from the normal sentencing hearing will help cast its advisory 
sentence as just desert for the crime—one factor a judge may consider to form his or her 
independent sentencing decision—and help allay concern that the advisory sentence will 
become the de facto sentence. Bifurcating the jury’s duties into guilt and sentencing stages 
will further allow juries to focus dispassionately on determining guilt with comfort that a 
conviction’s consequences will not be entirely unmoored from their own moral conscience. 
By forcing the jury to look to its conscience and its conscience alone when forming the 
advisory sentence, its sentence will represent the purest sense of just desert available to the 
criminal justice system. And, by implementing these procedures as a feature of the criminal 
jury right rather than an alternative to the jury right, the system-wide benefits it conveys 
may be captured with little additional burden on the courts. 
 Hypothetically, even if all the foregoing proposals are implemented, it is possible 
that judges may not afford advisory sentences any persuasive effect. The realization that 
some judges are happy to defer to juries to help relieve themselves of the moral burden of 
imposing sentences cuts against this notion.223 Nevertheless, one may surmise that judges 
do not need advice on sentencing and will not follow a recommendation even if given. If 
so, is there any point to the criminal advisory jury or is it adding costs, however marginal, 
to the trial process without any benefit whatsoever?  
Notably, advisory sentences will benefit the legal system even if their effect on actual 
sentences is insubstantial. Advisory sentences will become a part of the trial record and the 
aggregation of such data will be invaluable to sentencing reform efforts. Judges and 
prosecutors too will benefit over time by learning the community “price” for particular 
offenses. Further, if actual sentences result in harsher punishment than advisory sentences, 
defendants may potentially gain a supporting argument for use in future parole hearings or 
pardon petitions. And if actual sentences result in more leniency, the advisory sentence will 
at least come to be seen as a telling form of public reprimand. Finally, jurors themselves 
will take greater satisfaction in their civic duties given the opportunity to express their 
moral opinions of the criminal acts—an opportunity which the verdict alone does not 
 
222 Yet another alternative to a non-unanimous decision rule would be to time limit the sentencing decision. 
If the advisory jury does not reach a unanimous sentencing consensus within a certain time (three hours, for 
instance), then the jury will forego recommending a sentence to the judge. 
223 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
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adequately provide. Ultimately, then, even if advisory sentences are ignored in sentencing 
decisions, the benefits they will afford to parties, the court, and society will still outweigh 
their costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury’s prime function in the criminal justice system is to express community 
outrage and thereby provide legitimacy for the exercise of state power. This idea is diluted, 
however, if the jury is only allowed a voice in the verdict and not in the punishment. The 
proposals set forth in this Note increase the jury’s voice at sentencing without dissolving 
the trust and flexibility inherent with judicial discretion. These proposals admittedly 
include intuitive and logical arguments requiring empirical study. However, jury 
sentencing advocates should view them as modest proposals that expand jury influence 
incrementally, without the need to alter Sixth Amendment jurisprudence or overcome long-
standing legal community aversion to abdicating punishment authority to the layperson.  
Likewise, jury sentencing opponents who fear the lay adjudicator may take comfort 
that the judge still reigns supreme over sentencing. And correspondingly, the legal 
community may test doubts of jury competence with little consequence or additional 
procedural burden on the courts. Certainly, the criminal advisory jury is not a perfect 
solution for any side of the sentencing reform debate. But in the spirit of compromise, let 
not perfect be the enemy of good. 
